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The effects of integration and transnational ties on international 






While return migration is receiving increasing attention, there is still insufficient insight 
into the factors which determine migrants’ intentions and decisions to return. It is often 
assumed that integration in receiving countries and the concomitant weakening of 
transnational ties decreases the likelihood of returning. However, according to 
alternative theoretical interpretations, return migration can also be the outflow of 
successful integration in receiving countries. Drawing on a dataset of four African 
immigrant groups in Spain and Italy, this article reviews these conflicting hypotheses 
by assessing the effects of integration and transnational ties on return migration 
intentions. The results of the analysis suggest that sociocultural integration has a 
negative effect on return migration intentions, while economic integration and 
transnational ties have more ambiguous and sometimes positive effects. The results 
provide mixed support for the different hypotheses but question theoretical perspectives 
that unequivocally conceptualize return migration and transnationalism as causes and/or 
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1. Introduction 
Return migration has recently received renewed attention in research and policy 
(Cassarino 2004; Hammond 1999; Olesen 2002). This resurgence seems largely to be 
related to new hopes that politicians and other policy makers have pinned onto 
temporary migration as an instrument to meet labour market demands while avoiding 
the permanent settlement of migrants (Barber, Black, and Tenaglia 2005; Castles 2006; 
Ruhs 2006). In addition, temporary migration has increasingly been conceptualized as 
beneficial for the development of origin countries, whereby return migrants are often 
ascribed a key, innovative role in investment and economic development (Agunias 
2006; de Haas 2005; Ghosh 2006). 
Neither temporary migration nor the assumed link between return migration and 
origin country development are new phenomena or policy ideas. In the 1960s and 
1970s, for instance, “guest workers” were recruited from relatively poor Mediterranean 
countries such as Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia to work in the industries of the 
booming economies of North-Western Europe (Castles and Kosack 1973). 
Governments of both sending and receiving countries initially considered this migration 
as temporary, and the workers were widely expected to play a positive role in economic 
development of origin countries through investing their savings after return. After the 
1973 Oil Crisis and the subsequent economic downturn, governments of countries such 
as France, Germany, and the Netherlands attempted to encourage return migration, 
sometimes by linking return migration to investment and development schemes in 
origin countries (De Mas 1978; Entzinger 1985; Penninx 1982). However, although 
significant return did occur, many “guest workers” ended up settling in destination 
countries, as was testified by large-scale family reunification migration in the 1970s and 
1980s. 
Most theories on migrant integration or assimilation suggest that the longer 
migrants stay, the more they become integrated in receiving societies, the more difficult 
it becomes to return in practice, and the more they are inclined to settle. This has strong 
parallels with neoclassical migration theory, as formulated by Harris and Todaro, which 
represents migration as an attempt by individuals to maximize their utility by moving to 
places where they can be more productive (Harris and Todaro 1970; Massey et al. 1998; 
Todaro and Maruszko 1987). Such theories tend to interpret migration as an investment 
in human capital, predicting that migrants move to places where they can expect the 
highest economic returns on their human resources; according to these theories 
migration is expected to occur when there is a good chance migrants will recoup their 
human capital investment once migration and adaptation costs and risks are taken into 
account (Bauer and Zimmermann 1998; Sjaastad 1962). From this we can derive that if 
migrants integrate successfully, they can be more productive than in their origin Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 24 
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countries, and there will be no rationale for returning. On the contrary, if individual 
migrants fail to find employment and to improve their lives through migrating, they are 
more likely to return. So, within this perspective, return migration is mainly interpreted 
as a result of structural (educational and economic) integration failure. Put differently, 
while “winners” settle, “losers” return. 
A second, related inference is that the likelihood and desire to return decrease 
when social and economic ties with origin countries weaken, and migrants increasingly 
shift their focus towards receiving societies. In particular, family reunification is 
commonly thought to make migration largely irreversible. If migration is primarily 
perceived as an individual cost-benefit analysis, it would make little sense for 
successfully integrated migrants to maintain sociocultural and economic ties with 
sending countries, because maintaining ties with people in origin countries would raise 
the financial and psychological costs of staying. The other way around, attachments to 
destination countries will decrease the costs of staying and increase the costs of 
returning. 
From this set of theoretical considerations, we can hypothesize that (1) economic 
and sociocultural integration in destination countries and (2) strong social and economic 
ties with the destination country have a negative effect on the likelihood of return. It is 
important to acknowledge that this causality is also likely to work the other way 
around: migrants who already intend to return will feel less compelled to integrate into 
destination societies and will have stronger motivations to maintain social and 
economic ties with origin countries to prepare and facilitate their return. 
There is some empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. Using a multinomial 
logistic regression model of the intention to return, and drawing on survey data (1970–
1989) of Greek, Italian, Spanish, Yugoslav, and Turkish “guest workers” in Germany, 
Waldorf (1995) found that residential and job satisfaction consistently led to declining 
return intentions, while the influence of personal attributes such as gender or marital 
status was of little importance. She also observed declining return intentions over time, 
suggesting that the climate of return becomes less conducive to return as the ethnic 
communities become more established. Haug (2008) found evidence that the more 
social ties Italian migrants in Germany accumulated in their destination country, the 
less they were inclined to return. Analyzing survey data from Denmark, Jensen and 
Pedersen (2007) observed that various variables measuring labour market involvement 
had a significant negative effect on return migration. Dustmann (2008) found evidence 
that educational investments in children, as well as permanent wages, are positively 
associated with the probability of permanent migration of the father. 
The idea that there is a negative correlation between destination country 
integration and origin country orientation also fits within assimilationalist theories on 
immigrant integration (Castles and Miller 2003; Portes, Parker, and Cobas 1980), which de Haas & Fokkema: Return intention: the impact of integration and transnationalism 
   http://www.demographic-research.org  758
predict that immigrant communities will gradually assimilate into receiving societies, 
while transnational ties simultaneously decline. However, in recent years this assumed 
negative correlation has been challenged by the literature on migrant networks and 
transnationalism, which has shown that technical advances in transport and 
communication technologies have enabled immigrants to maintain intensive links with 
their societies of origin via the (mobile) telephone, fax, (satellite) television, the 
internet, and remitting money through globalized banking systems or informal 
channels. This has expanded the scope for migrants to foster multiple belongings and 
double loyalties, to hold dual citizenship, to travel back and forth, and to work and to do 
business simultaneously in distant places (de Haas 2005; Glick Schiller, Basch, and 
Szanton-Blanc 1992; Portes 1999; Vertovec 2004). 
This transnationalization of migrants’ lives has also increasingly challenged 
assimilationist models of migrant integration as well as the idea that the maintenance of 
social and economic ties with origin countries is necessarily a manifestation or cause of 
migrants’ inability or unwillingness to integrate. Some empirical evidence supports the 
idea that integration and transnational ties are not necessarily substitutes, but can be 
complements. Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt (1999) asserted that transnational 
orientations and activities are generally positively associated with the integration of 
both parents and children, and can facilitate successful adaptation by providing 
opportunities for (transnational) entrepreneurship and economic mobility (see also 
Granovetter 1995; Portes, Haller, and Guarnizo 2002). Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 
(2003) found that increased education of immigrants increases political participation in 
receiving and origin countries. Snel, Engbersen, and Leerkes (2006) countered the idea 
that immigrant groups (Moroccans, Antilleans) who are often said to be poorly 
integrated into Dutch society necessarily show more transnational involvement. In a 
similar vein, the literature on migrant remittances has questioned the hypothesis that 
remittances automatically decline over time due to progressive integration and 
weakening ties (Brown 1994; de Haas and Plug 2006; Taylor 1999; van Dalen, 
Groenewold, and Fokkema 2005). 
Such perhaps counterintuitive empirical findings can be explained from a 
capabilities  (cf. Sen 1999) standpoint: even if “integrated” and socially and 
economically settled migrants have less strong ties with origin countries (which is not 
necessarily the case), their increased personal, social, and financial capabilities for 
maintaining ties with origin societies can partly or more than counterbalance the first 
effect. Successful and “integrated” migrants generally also use increased cognitive and 
financial capacity for maintaining transnational ties, for example through remitting 
money, visiting family, setting up enterprises and civic participation in origin countries. 
The inference is that strong transnational ties can also be positively associated with 
integration. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 24 
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While the literature on migrant transnationalism has questioned the idea that 
transnationalism and integration are necessarily substitutes, the new economics of labor 
migration (NELM) offers a powerful conceptual link between these two issues and 
return migration. NELM interprets migration as a livelihood strategy employed by 
households and families to spread income risks and to overcome sending country 
(credit, insurance) market constraints. This co-insurance model is a departure from 
conventional neoclassical models which conceptualize migration as the behaviour of 
utility-maximizing individuals. The central idea of NELM is that households send out 
best-suited individuals to gain an income elsewhere. The money migrants remit serves 
to spread income risks and to increase income and living conditions, and enables them 
to invest (Stark 1991; Taylor 1999; Taylor, Rozelle, and de Brauw 2003). Although 
NELM focuses on explaining migration behaviour, we can also derive an alternative 
interpretation of return migration which challenges conventional hypotheses that 
postulate a negative association between integration and return migration.  
Within the NELM perspective, migrants and their households have an interest in 
optimizing their integration, because this will increase income and reduce livelihood 
risks for their households in sending countries, but this will not necessarily result in 
permanent settlement. However, the projected return is likely to be postponed for 
sustained or indefinite periods if integration is unsuccessful. If migrants are 
conceptualized as “target savers,” and the prime motive for migrating is to improve the 
situation at home, migrants will only return once they have succeeded to amass, save, 
and remit enough financial or human capital in order to realize their investment plans. 
Moreover, the conceptualization of migration as investment in human capital 
provides an additional explanation for why return migration can be positively correlated 
to successful economic integration. If the act of migrating itself is also a means to 
accumulate more human capital through work experience and education, migrants can 
be expected to return only after enough human capital has been accumulated abroad.
3 
Importantly, this turns conventional interpretations of return migration upside 
down; that is, from an indication or result of integration failure to a measure of success. 
Particularly within a NELM perspective, non-achievement of the goal of return 
migration due to low income, unemployment or high costs will then lead to a prolonged 
stay. Permanent settlement then becomes the end result of repeated postponement of 
return because of integration “failure.” At first glance, this pattern seems to reflect the 
collective experience of “guest workers” in Europe mentioned above, who often ended 
up staying while experiencing high unemployment and social marginalization. Their 
prolonged stay and settlement did not, however, lead to a significant decrease in the 
 
3 However, we should not assume that human capital can be acquired and transferred at no cost. For instance, 
degrees obtained in one country are not necessarily recognized in other countries. Skills, such as language 
skills, acquired in the destination country are not necessarily deployable in origin countries.  de Haas & Fokkema: Return intention: the impact of integration and transnationalism 
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transnational ties they maintained with origin societies (de Bree 2007; Reniers 2001; 
Snel, Engbersen, and Leerkes 2006). 
Thus, different migration and integration theories offer rather different 
interpretations of return migration, and lead to partially opposed hypotheses about the 
relationship between integration and the maintenance of transnational ties on the one 
hand, and return migration on the other. While the first set of theories hypothesizes that 
economic and sociocultural integration will decrease return intentions, the second set of 
theories hypothesizes the reverse.  
Both strands of theories predict a positive effect of transnational social and 
economic ties on return intentions. However, as Constant and Massey (2002:11) 
argued, interpretations associated with conventional neoclassical theory assume that 
although migrants may leave spouses or children at home, their goal is generally to 
achieve higher lifetime earnings through permanent settlement abroad. Migrants are 
therefore willing to endure long separations until arrangements can be made for family 
reunification, which remains the ultimate goal. As a result, the positive effect of 
transnational social ties with family living in origin countries on return migration can be 
expected to be stronger under NELM. 
There is still a lack of pertinent studies and adequate data to test these conflicting 
hypotheses. While existing studies focus on the effects of either integration or 
transnationalism on return migration, to our knowledge no studies have tried to look at 
these effects simultaneously, with the exception of Constant and Massey’s (2002) 
study. Our study aims to fill part of this empirical gap by analyzing a unique dataset to 
assess the microlevel determinants of return migration intentions among four recent 
African migrant groups living in Spain and Italy. By simultaneously assessing the effect 
of various indicators of integration and transnational ties on international return 
migration, this article provided a test of the conflicting hypotheses elaborated above. 
This study focuses on return migration intentions, not on actual behaviour. The 
focus on intentions allows the study of migration motivations that may or may not 
precede actual migration behaviour. Most empirical work focuses on actual return 
migration behaviour. While this generates valuable post-hoc explanations for observed 
migration events, it will also be relevant to study return migration intentions. As 
Waldorf (1995) argued, the conventional focus on actual return is based on the implicit 
assumption that observed behaviour is preceded by a desire to migrate and that the 
factors influencing actual behaviour affect migration intentions in a similar fashion. 
However, there might be discrepancies between intentions and actual migration 
behaviour. Several social, economic, and political constraints explain why many people 
often do not migrate or return even if they have the wish to do so, and the other way 
around. 
 Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 24 
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2. Methods  
2.1 Data  
This study draws on survey data collected in 1997 as part of the “Push and Pull Factors 
of International Migration” research project
4 in five predominantly migrant-sending 
countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region (Egypt, Morocco and 
Turkey) and in sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana and Senegal), and in two predominantly 
migrant-receiving countries in the Mediterranean region (Italy and Spain). This survey 
allowed the simultaneous collection of pre and postmigration data, including data on the 
migration process itself, integration and transnational ties. 
In the present article we will only focus on the two receiving countries: Italy and 
Spain. In Italy, members of migrant households from Egypt and Ghana participated in 
the survey; in Spain their peers from Morocco and Senegal. Because of financial and 
logistic constraints, regionally representative rather than nationally representative 
sample designs were used. In Italy, a few cities and their provinces in two main 
geographical areas of the country were selected (Milan, Brescia, Bergamo and Modena 
in Northern Italy; Rome, Latina, Naples and Caserta in Central-Southern Italy), while in 
Spain the sample comprised five regions (Catalonia, Levant, Andalusia, Madrid and the 
Canary Islands). In addition, in every household only one person, the so-called main 
migration actor (MMA), was selected for a long interview. The MMAs were persons 
between 18 and 65 years who were born in the country of origin and who were 18 years 
or older when they left their country of birth within the period of ten years preceding 
the survey. For further information on the criteria used to select the MMA, sampling 
methods and representativeness, see Schoorl et al. (2000). In the long individual MMA 
questionnaire, extensive data was gathered about the situation surrounding the last 
migration, the current situation in the country of destination, and the intentions for 
future migration. From this MMA-sample we excluded full-time students (n=26) 
because their degree of economic integration is less than it will be once they have 
completed their studies and are in the workforce. That is, it is likely that they will be 
more economically integrated than current data on them will reflect. Our analyses are 
further restricted to the 1582 male and 301 female MMAs for whom data on all the 




4 The project was funded by the European Commission, executed by Eurostat, and implemented by the 
Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) in collaboration with research institutes in the 
countries where the survey was conducted. de Haas & Fokkema: Return intention: the impact of integration and transnationalism 
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2.2 Measuring instruments  
Return migration intentions  
 
Respondents were asked the following question: “Do you intend to stay in this country, 
to return to < name country of origin >, to migrate to another country, or don’t you 
know?” Those who wished to go back to their country of birth were also asked when 
they intend to return: “within a year,” “between one and two years from now,” “after 
more than two years,” “not sure yet/don’t know yet.” While a sizeable proportion of the 
respondents intended to return to origin countries (for details, see below), they often did 
not have a specific idea on the timing of their return: less than one-third of the potential 
returnees mentioned a particular time period. In addition, only 5% of the respondents 
expressed the intention to move to a country other than their country of birth. Hence, 
our analyses are restricted to the potential stayers, potential returnees, and those who 




The first set of predictors captures background characteristics. Country of birth is 
represented by three country dummy variables with Morocco as the reference category. 
Respondents’ age ranged from 19 to 65.
5 Gender was coded as 0 = male, and 1 = 
female. We included four different indicators of prior migration experience: whether 
respondents (1) lived in the receiving country for at least one year prior to last 
migration, (2) ever returned to the origin country for at least one year, (3) ever lived in 
another foreign country for at least one year, and (4) lived and/or travelled abroad for a 
period of less than one year prior to their first migration. The scores were 0 = no and 1 
= yes. The length of stay indicates the number of years the respondents lived in the 
country of destination (range: 0–10 years).
6 Four levels of educational attainment were 
assessed: 1 = incomplete education (reference category), 2 = primary, 3 = secondary, 
and 4 = above secondary. Since the overwhelming majority (98%) of the respondents 
completed their education in their country of birth, educational attainment can be 
considered as a proxy indicating human capital gathered before they left their country 
of birth.
7 Five groups of main migration motive were distinguished: 1 = financial needs 
 
5 Examination of age squared yielded no significant effects and was therefore excluded from the final 
analysis. 
6 Including its square did not improve the model and hence was excluded from the final analysis. 
7 The percentages of those who attended their highest level of education in the country of origin range from 
95.5% among the Egyptian migrants to 99.4% among the Senegalese migrants; whether these migrants also 
required education in the country of destination, either at a lower level or without completing a diploma or 
certificate, is unknown. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 24 
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(e.g., “income insufficient,” “needed money to get married or because of family 
expansion,” and “to finance children’s education”), 2 = improvement of working 
conditions (e.g., “had no job/could not find job,” “to seek job and/or income,” and 
“nature of work was unsatisfactory”), 3 = improvement of other living conditions (e.g., 
“improve living standard,” “no opportunities to save money,” and “to get education”), 4 
= relational motives (e.g., “to get married/just married,” “to accompany/follow spouse,” 
and “to accompany/follow parent(s)”), and 5 = other, more “existential” motives (e.g., 
“dislike of living in the country of birth,” “the lure of adventure,” “the desire to go 
abroad,” and “fear of war, civil conflict or prosecution”).  
Our analysis distinguishes between structural and sociocultural integration. 
Structural integration pertains to the acquisition of rights and status within the core 
institutions of the receiving society, such as employment, housing, education, political, 
and citizenship rights (Heckmann 2005). Sociocultural integration refers to the 
cognitive, behavioural, and attitudinal changes in conformity to the dominant norms of 
receiving societies (cultural integration or acculturation); social intercourse, friendship, 
marriage, and membership of various organizations (interactive integration); and 
feelings of belonging, expressed in terms of allegiance to ethnic, regional, local, and 
national identity (identificational integration) (King and Skeldon 2010). We 
acknowledge that integration is a highly contested concept in wide-ranging debates in 
the US and Europe and, although it is often contrasted to “assimilation,” integration and 
assimilation are terms of shifting and often overlapping meaning (King and Christou 
2007). Operational definitions of integration often focus on adaptation to majority 
society and culture. This makes them often virtually indistinguishable from assimilation 
and does not question the hegemonic role of receiving societies as well as the false 
notion that there is one, monolithic “mainstream.” It is not the aim of this article to 
indulge in this complex debate, but it is important to be aware of the contested, 
normative, and politicized nature of the integration concept. 
The survey data comprise six different indicators of respondents’ sociocultural 
integration. The first two indicators – ethnic nature of migrants’ social network 
(running from 0 = mainly keep company with compatriots or people from other 
countries/do not meet socially, to 2 = mainly keep company with native citizens) and 
close friends among native citizens (0 = no, 1 = yes) – represent the degree of informal 
contact with the native population (objective, social dimension). The third, fourth, and 
fifth indicators – background of organizations (running from 0 = participating in one or 
more organizations where the destination country language is usually not spoken, to 2 = 
exclusively active in one or more organizations where the destination country language 
is the official language), language fluency (running from 0 = unable to speak, read, and 
write the language of country of destination, to 3 = able to speak, read, and write the 
language of country of destination) and degree of modern values (range: 0–9, the higher de Haas & Fokkema: Return intention: the impact of integration and transnationalism 
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the score, the more modern the view regarding nine statements on gender roles and 
(parent–child) relationships) – give insight into the extent to which migrants distinguish 
themselves from the native population with regard to language, habit, standards, and 
values (objective, cultural dimension). The last indicator – ethnic identification (running 
from 0 = feeling that they most belong to their country of birth, to 2 = feeling that they 
most belong to their country of destination) – represents the degree of identification 
with their own immigrant group (subjective). Instead of studying these dimensions and 
indicators separately, we constructed one index of sociocultural integration: the six 
indicators were summed after the range of each indicator has been revalued with a 
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1 (Cronbach’s alpha for the index was 0.60). As a 
result, the score on the index variable is at least 0 and at most 6. The higher the score, 
the more the migrant was integrated socioculturally. 
Respondents’ structural integration was measured by labour force participation and 
occupational status of the current job. With regard to labour force participation, two 
dummy variables were created, viz. “full-time job” and “part-time job” (< 32 hours per 
week). Respondents who had no paid job at the time of the interview form the reference 
group. Occupational status was classified according to the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and subsequently recoded into the International 
Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996)), 
running from 16 (e.g., domestic workers, cleaners and launderers, agricultural, and 
fishery laborers) to 88 (medical doctors). The mean ISEI-score for the surveyed 
immigrant groups was attributed to those who did not currently work. 
The fourth and fifth set of predictors pertained to economic ties with receiving and 
origin countries. For economic ties with the country of destination, we included the 
dummy variables (0 = no, 1 = yes) owner of a house and owning a household business. 
Insight into the economic ties with the country of birth was gathered by the dummy 
variable (0 = no, 1 = yes) investment, indicating whether or not the respondent owned 
any property such as a house, a business, or land in his or her country of birth, and 
respondents’ household behaviour regarding remittances. With regard to the latter, 
respondents were asked whether they or anyone else in the household sent or brought 
during the past twelve months (1) money on a regular basis, (2) money on an irregular 
basis, or (3) goods for free, other than tourist souvenirs or small presents, to people 
living in the country of birth to be used for their own benefit or (4) sent or brought 
money to the country of birth for community purposes (e.g., to build/renovate a 
hospital, school or mosque/church, to give alms/Ramadan). The scores were 0 = no, and 
1 = yes. 
The final two sets of predictors pertained to social ties with receiving country and 
origin country, respectively: having (1) one or both parents, (2) at least one partner, (3) 
one or more children under the age of 18, (4) one or more children aged 18 years or Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 24 
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older, (5) one or more siblings living in the country of destination and birth, 
respectively. The scores were 0 = no, and 1 = yes. 
 
 
2.3 Analytical strategy 
We will begin by presenting some statistics on return migration intentions and motives 
and background characteristics for the four immigrant groups to convey a sense of the 
importance of the phenomenon of return migration and differences across immigrant 
groups. Next, multinominal logistic regression analysis is employed to simultaneously 
test hypotheses on the effects of sociocultural and structural integration in receiving 
countries and socioeconomic ties with origin and receiving countries on migrants’ 
intention to return. Multinomial logistic regression is an extension of binary logistic 
regression used when the dependent variable (i.e., “intention to stay in receiving 
country,” “intention to return to origin country,” “not sure whether or not to return”) has 
three or more categories. The model breaks the regression up into a series of binary 
regressions comparing each of the possible outcomes to the baseline outcome. We 
choose the baseline for the dependent variable to be “does intend to stay.” 
 
 
3. Results  
3.1 Return intentions and return reasons 
Wish to return and background characteristics 
 
Descriptive information on the variables included in the analysis is presented in Table 
1. While 28% of all surveyed migrants wished to return, 40% wished to stay in the host 
country and 33% were unsure. Yet there are differences between the four immigrant 
groups. While Ghanaian and Egyptian migrants scored around average, Moroccans 
were least inclined to return, with over half declaring that they preferred to stay and 
only 16% declaring that they wished to return. Intentions to return were highest among 
the Senegalese, with 38% wishing to return and 31% wishing to stay. de Haas & Fokkema: Return intention: the impact of integration and transnationalism 
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 %M%M%M % M   %   M  
Migration intention to origin country                
  Yes, return to origin country  16.1   28.2   29.2   37.6   27.6 
  Do not know  30.4   36.7   33.5   31.3   32.9 
  No, stay in receiving country  53.5   35.1   37.4   31.1   39.5 
Background characteristics              
Age  (19-65)   34.6  33.4  33.3   34.7    34.0
Female  28.0   5.5   19.8   8.2   16.0 
Prior  migration  experience:              
  Long stay in receiving country  0.8    0.7    0.7    1.9   1.0 
  Long stay in origin country  5.5    5.2    6.9    11.4   7.2 
  Long stay in another country  7.9    11.4    12.8    25.0   14.0 
  Short stay abroad  17.4    19.2    18.7    24.5   19.8 
Length of stay (in years: 0-10)    5.6   6.3   5.8   5.4    5.8
Level  of  education:              
  Incomplete  education  39.9   7.1   3.6   53.3   24.7 
  Primary  37.8   9.0   30.6   39.3   29.5 
  Secondary  17.6   53.8   58.9   6.5   35.5 
  Above  secondary  4.7   30.1   6.9   0.9   10.2 
Main  motive  of  migration:              
  Financial  needs  24.4   22.7   25.3   25.2   24.5 
  Improvement of working conditions  36.7    36.7    50.4    56.8   45.4 
  Improvement of other living conditions  20.4    21.6    15.1    8.4   16.4 
  Relational  motives  8.1   7.1   5.3   6.8   6.7 
  Other  motives  10.0   11.1   2.8   2.3   6.4 
Sociocultural integration (0-6)   2.7  2.7  2.5   1.7    2.4
Structural integration              
Working  status:              
  Full-time  job  73.0   80.8   68.9   79.7   75.0 
  Part-time  job  10.6   8.8   12.8   8.2   10.3 
  No  job  16.4   10.4   18.3   12.1   14.7 
Occupational status current job (16-88)    27.1   29.9   28.7   26.7    28.1
Economic ties receiving country              
Household business in receiving country  17.2    8.3    1.8    56.8   19.6 
Owner of a house  8.1    7.8    2.7    5.6   5.8 
Social ties receiving country              
Parent(s) living in receiving country  4.2    1.7    0.5    0.0   1.6 
Partner living in receiving country  37.2    42.9    31.1    13.8   31.3 
Children 18- living in receiving country  28.9    28.9    16.7    6.8   20.2 
Children 18+ living in receiving country  8.5    0.7    0.7    0.5   2.6 
Siblings living in receiving country  22.3    17.1    16.9    8.4   16.4 
Economic ties origin country              
Investment in origin country  21.0    42.7    34.7    43.5   35.1 
Remittances:              
  Money:  regular  18.0   7.8   11.2   25.7   15.5 
  Money:  irregular  50.5   36.3   53.7   66.8   52.0 
  Goods  44.4   35.5   42.9   47.0   42.5 
  Remittances for community use  1.5    7.6    3.9    48.4   14.2 
Social ties origin country              
Parent(s) living in origin country  83.4    85.8    84.9    79.7   83.5 
Partner living in origin country  19.3    18.2    32.2    66.8   33.7 
Children 18- living in origin country  18.0    16.4    40.7    55.1   32.9 
Children 18+ living in origin country  7.4    1.2    5.7    6.8   5.4 
Siblings living in origin country  90.0    87.2    88.4    95.6   90.2 
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These differences are striking since the average length of stay (5.8 years) and age 
(34) were similar among all four groups. However, looking at other background 
characteristics, we find some differences. The proportion of female migrants was 
relatively high among Moroccans (28%) and Ghanaians (20%) and low among 
Senegalese (8%) and Egyptians (6%). This can be largely ascribed to different 
migration patterns. While most of the migration of women from Egypt and Senegal is 
still linked to that of their husbands, Moroccan and Ghanaian women increasingly 
migrate on their own to work in the domestic and other service sectors in southern 
Europe (Arango et al. 1999). Migration experiences and motives also differed among 
the four migrant groups. A relatively high proportion of Senegalese had migration 
experience abroad prior to the current migration, including both long-lasting 
international migrations (staying abroad for one year or longer) and shorter moves 
abroad. While 87% of the respondents mentioned economic circumstances as their main 
migration motive, Ghanaian and, particularly, Senegalese migrants mentioned 
improvement of working conditions (e.g., finding a job) more often, while Moroccans 
and Egyptians mentioned improvement of living conditions comparatively more often. 
Relational and “other” motives were less important generally. Perhaps the most salient 
differences are found in educational levels. Senegalese had the lowest educational 
levels while Egyptians and Ghanaians were the best educated groups within this 
sample. 
Whereas Moroccans, Egyptians, and Ghanaians scored similarly high on the index 
of sociocultural integration, Senegalese scored much lower. With regard to structural 
integration (i.e., labour market participation and occupational status of current job), the 
proportion of unemployed migrants was higher among Moroccans and Ghanaians. This 
cannot be related to the higher number of women in these two groups, since 
unemployment rates were much higher among Egyptian and Senegalese than among 
Moroccan and, particularly, Ghanaian women (results not shown). In addition, the 
occupational status of employed Ghanaians and Moroccans was on average higher than 
the occupational status of Senegalese workers. 
The proportion of migrants owning a household business in the receiving country 
was 57% among Senegalese (of whom no less than 81% were engaged in petty trading), 
17% among Moroccans and even lower among Egyptians (8%) and Ghanaians (2%). 
This might reflect the relatively more entrepreneurial and trading culture among 
Senegalese migrants. Only 6% of all migrants owned a house in the destination 
countries. Relatively many Moroccan and Egyptian migrants had direct family 
members (parents, spouses, children, siblings) living with them in the destination 
country. Senegalese migrants scored lowest on all these variables, with Ghanaian 
migrants scoring at average levels. The higher degree of family reunification among 
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migration in Italy and Spain compared to sub-Saharan migrant groups. Senegalese 
migrants in particular (still) seem to stand in a much more temporary migration 
tradition and also have significantly lower levels of sociocultural integration. 
We also find striking differences looking at the social and economic ties migrants 
maintain with origin countries. Whereas one-third of all migrants had invested in origin 
countries, this proportion was much higher among Senegalese and Egyptians and 
particularly low among Moroccans. Although the majority among all immigrant groups 
remitted money, this accounted for no less than 93% of Senegalese migrants. While 
48% of Senegalese also remitted money for community purposes, this proportion was 
almost negligible among other immigrant groups. The more settled nature of North 
African migration is evident from the fact that over 80% of Moroccan and Egyptian 
migrants lived in the destination country with his or her partner, whereas this applied to 
only one-third and two-thirds of Senegalese and Ghanaian migrants, respectively. A 
similar pattern applied for the proportion of migrants with minor children living in 
origin countries. This reflects much lower family reunification among the Senegalese in 
particular. All in all, Senegalese were more oriented towards origin countries than 
Egyptians and Moroccans were, with Ghanaian migrants occupying a middle position. 
 
Reason to return 
 
Table 2 shows the first stated reason for return among those migrants with a return 
intention. Obviously, reasons for return are almost always complex and multi-layered, 
and tend to imply a confluence of structural conditions and personal circumstances. 
However, the stated replies of migrants to the questions why they would return will 
give at least some direction which can also be useful for the interpretation of the results 
of the regression analysis. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 24 
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Table 2:  First reason to return to origin country among those who have a 













Job-related 28.9 20.2 28.0 33.3 28.1 
  Cannot find job  0.0  4.2  3.7  1.9  2.7 
  Does not like job  0.0  3.4  2.4  1.9  2.1 
  Retirement  1.3 0.0 1.2 0.6 0.8 
  Start  business  21.1 10.9 18.3 25.5 19.2 
  Need in family business  6.6  1.7  2.4  3.7  3.3 
Income-related  11.8 4.2 6.1 3.7 5.8 
  Low  income  2.6 2.5 1.8 1.2 1.9 
  Saved enough money  9.2  1.7  3.7  1.2  3.3 
  Inheritances  0.0 0.0 0.6 1.2 0.6 
Family-related  30.3 30.3 40.2 43.5 37.5 
  Parents and/or spouse want it  6.6  0.8  1.2  0.0  1.5 
  Marriage in origin country  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.2  0.4 
  Problems child raising in receiving  5.3  8.4  1.8  0.0  3.3 
  Accompany  spouse/parents  1.3 1.7 0.6 1.2 1.2 
  Join the family  15.8  18.5  29.9  39.8  28.3 
  Other  family  reasons  1.3 0.8 6.7 1.2 2.9 
Unfavourable situation in receiving country 15.8  37.0  24.4  8.1  21.0 
  Dislike way of life in receiving country  7.9  5.0  1.8  0.6  3.1 
  Permit  expired  0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.4 
 Homesickness  2.6  15.1  11.6  2.5  8.3 
  Belong in origin country  2.6  16.0  9.8  3.7  8.3 
  No future in receiving country  2.6  0.8  0.0  1.2  1.0 
Other  15.8 3.4 0.6  11.8 6.9 
  Bad  health  1.3 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.4 
  Completed  education  3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
  Last days of life in country of origin  2.6  0.0  0.0  4.3  1.7 
  Other  reasons  5.3 2.4 0.0 6.2 3.3 
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Overall, family-related reasons were most important, in particular the wish to join 
the family, followed by work-related reasons, in particular the wish to start a new 
business in the country of origin. A distinct category was formed by Moroccans who 
migrated to Spain with the intention to return after completion of their education. These 
motives fit within the new economics of labour migration (NELM) and human capital 
theory. 
Family-related reasons were particularly important among Senegalese and 
Ghanaian migrants, and much less so among Egyptians and Moroccans. This mirrors 
the high proportion of sub-Saharan migrants who migrated without spouses and 
children. Business-related reasons were relatively more important among Senegalese 
migrants than among the other immigrant groups. A relatively high proportion (37%) of 
Egyptian migrants stated that factors like homesickness and feelings of not belonging 
drew them back to their origin countries. 
 
 
3.2 Determinants of return intentions 
Table 3 shows the relative risk ratios from the multinomial logistic regression model 
with their statistical significance. The reference group for the dependent variable 
contains those who intended to stay. The country dummies indicate that, after 
controlling for other factors, Egyptian migrants were less likely to express an intention 
to return than their Moroccan counterparts. Senegalese migrants, on the other hand, 
were significantly more uncertain about the likelihood of their staying and were more 
likely to intend to return than the other three immigrant groups. This might indicate that 
the Senegalese stand in a particular tradition of circular migration, and other cultural 
factors were at stake which could not be fully captured by the mainly social and 
economic variables in this analysis. However, this result fits with other evidence that 
Senegalese migrants do tend to form a distinct migrant group, in which ethnic and 
religious community bonds tend to remain strong and migration is often strongly tied in 
with transnational entrepreneurship and trade networks (Babou 2002; Pian 2005; Riccio 
2001). Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 24 
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Table 3:  Relative risk ratios from multinomial logistic regression of migration 
intention to origin country (baseline of dependent variable is 
‘intention to stay in receiving country’) 
 
 
Not sure whether to 
stay or return 
Intention to return 
to origin country 
Background characteristics   
Country of birth (ref. Morocco):   
 Egypt  0.92  0.63* 
 Ghana  1.09  0.98 
 Senegal  2.56***  1.98** 
Age 0.99  1.01 
Female 0.83  0.91 
Prior migration experience (no prior experience):    
  Long stay in receiving country  1.29  1.44 
  Long stay in origin country  1.86  0.94 
  Long stay in another country  0.58*  0.97 
  Short stay abroad  0.54***  0.93 
Length of stay  1.07**  1.06 
Level of education (ref. incomplete education):     
 Primary  1.69**  1.55* 
 Secondary  1.73**  1.98** 
 Above  secondary  2.06**  3.49*** 
Main motive of migration (ref. financial needs):     
 Improvement  working conditions  1.01  1.21 
  Improvement other living conditions  1.28  1.83** 
 Relational  motives  1.61  2.00* 
 Other  motives  0.69  0.96 
Sociocultural integration  0.64*** 0.64*** 
Structural integration    
Working status (ref. no job):     
 Full-time  job  1.01  1.10 
 Part-time  job  0.90  1.28 
Occupational status current job  1.01  1.00 
Economic ties receiving country    
Household business in receiving country  0.48***  0.82 
Owner of a house  0.84  0.91 
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Table 3:  (Continued) 
 
 
Not sure whether to 
stay or return 
Intention to return 
to origin country 
Social ties receiving country   
Parent(s) living in receiving country  1.07  0.42 
Partner living in receiving country  0.84  0.99 
Children 18- living in receiving country  0.67*  0.87 
Children 18+ living in receiving country  2.08  0.57 
Siblings living in receiving country  0.90  1.20 
Economic ties origin country    
Investment in origin country  1.41*  2.30*** 
Remittances:    
 Money:  regular  0.48**  1.31 
 Money:  irregular  0.71*  1.33 
 Goods  0.83  0.87 
  Remittances for community use  0.61*  0.62* 
Social ties origin country    
Parent(s) living in origin country  1.32  1.18 
Partner living in origin country  0.76  1.01 
Children 18- living in origin country  0.76  1.18 
Children 18+ living in origin country  1.14  0.79 
Siblings living in origin country  0.69  0.35 
 
*** p<  .001;  ** p< .01;  * p< .05 
 
Generally, prior migration experiences in the form of long stays in origin and/or 
destination countries did not significantly influence intentions to stay or return. Prior 
long stay in another country and previous short stay abroad clearly decreased the 
likelihood of being uncertain about whether to return or not. This seems to reflect the 
more “mature” status of experienced migrants, who have moved several times, and 
might have developed more definite ideas about their future lives. Overall, the original 
main motives for migration did not have a significant impact on return intention; only 
those who migrated to improve their living conditions or for relational motives more 
often expressed the intention to return. This exemplifies the limited value of 
conventional migrant categorizations to predict eventual migration and settlement 
trajectories. 
Return intentions did not seem to be affected by respondents’ age and length of 
stay. While age did not have any significant effects, length of stay was only positively 
associated with an increased uncertainty about whether to stay or not. These results are 
somehow surprising and run against the idea that living abroad for longer tends to 
decrease return intentions and actual return migration. It may be significant that the Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 24 
average stay of migrants in the sample was relatively short, which makes it impossible 
to capture long-term effects. Because the inclusion of various integration and 
transnationalism variables in the model, which are all a function of time to a certain 
extent, might also partly explain these results, we ran the regression with only 
background characteristics. However, even then the results showed neither a significant 
effect of age nor of length of stay on the likelihood of returning. Including squared 
values produced similar results as well. 
There is an unequivocally negative correlation between sociocultural integration 
and return intentions: the higher their level of sociocultural integration, the less likely 
the migrants were to express a return intention, or they were uncertain whether to stay 
or not. To facilitate interpretation of the impact of sociocultural integration, we 
calculated predicted probabilities of being in each of the three response categories of 
the dependent variable according to the degree of sociocultural integration. The 
remaining independent variables were set at the average level. Figure 1 shows that 
migrants highly integrated in sociocultural terms had the lowest likelihood of either 
being uncertain about staying or intending to return, while the reverse applied for the 
least socioculturally integrated migrants. Because causality is likely to be bidirectional, 
it is not clear where the primacy lies. After all, migrants who intend to return might also 
feel less compelled to integrate.  
 
Figure 1:  Predicted migration intention to origin country according to 
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While the above results seem entirely consistent with neoclassical migration and 
classical integration theory, the indicators measuring structural integration yielded a 
more uncertain and mixed picture. Owning a household business in receiving countries 
seemed to decrease uncertainty and the likelihood of intending to return. Although its 
coefficient was not significant in case of return intention, the direction of the effect 
seems to be in line with the hypothesis that economic integration will increase 
settlement tendencies. However, owning a house in the receiving country as well as 
work and occupational status did not have any significant effect on the intention of 
returning home.
8 An even more striking result is the positive effect of education on 
return migration intentions.
9 Figure 2 displays the predicted probabilities according to 
the level of education (with all the other variables set at their average values). While 
only 13% and 15% of those migrants with incomplete and primary education reported 
that they think they will return, this is the case for 21% and 22% of migrants with 
secondary and higher qualifications, respectively. At first sight, this seems 
counterintuitive because better educated migrants are expected to have better 
opportunities to find attractive jobs and face fewer integration problems overall, and are 
therefore less likely to have return intentions. However, it makes much more sense from 
NELM and related theoretical perspectives. 
Generally, social ties in receiving countries had negative effects on return 
intentions while social ties with sending countries had positive effects, but most of 
these effects did not attain statistical significance. The presence of minor children in the 
country of destination was the only variable that significantly decreased the likelihood 
of being uncertain about whether to return or not. Extreme caution is warranted when 
interpreting the causality of these relationships, since the decision to reunify families – 




8 To examine whether the non-significance of the effect of occupational status is partly the result of assigning 
the mean score for those not having a paid job (see Measuring instruments section), we re-ran the analysis for 
the employed migrants only. Also in this case we found no significant effect of occupational status on the 
intention to return. 
9 Since education systems vary between countries, the level of education may not be fully comparable across 
the migrant groups under study. Hence, we re-ran the model for each migrant group separately and the effect 
of education pointed in the same direction: the higher the level of education, the higher the likelihood of 
expressing a return intention. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 24 
Figure 2:  Predicted migration intention to origin country according to 









intention to stay in receiving
country
not sure whether to stay or
return
intention to return to origin
country
type of immigrants




Economic ties with origin countries had mixed effects on return intentions. 
Consistent with NELM, investments in origin countries had a positive and significant 
effect on return intentions. It goes without saying that this variable could also be partly 
endogenous, because it may also reflect initial intentions to migrate. This certainly 
applies to a return-prone group like the Senegalese, for whom business motives often 
play an important role in the (return) migration decision. The relationship between 
remittances and return intentions was more ambiguous. Migrants who sent regular and 
irregular remittances for individual and community use were less uncertain whether to 
stay or return, while those sending remittances for community use were less likely to 
have return intentions. A possible explanation for these findings can be derived from 
the remittance literature (Lucas and Stark 1985:901) and later empirical work (for 
reviews, see Agunias 2006; de Haas 2007; Rapoport and Docquier 2005; van Dalen, 
Groenewold, and Fokkema 2005) indicating that remittances should not only be seen as 
in migrants’ self-interest to set up businesses, but that migrants remit money because of 
a mixture of different individual and familial motives. Remittances often serve to secure 
inheritance, to repay migration debts incurred from family or community members, to 
finance education or to facilitate migration of other household members. If motivations 
to remit comprise a mix of altruism, co-insurance, and investment motives, there is also 
no obvious link between migration and return migration intentions. 
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4. Conclusion 
This study has generated mixed support for opposing theoretical perspectives, but 
questions the idea that there is an automatic link between integration, the weakening of 
transnational ties, and decreasing return intentions. Socio-cultural integration in 
receiving societies had a strongly negative effect on return migration intentions. This 
finding is in line with neoclassical migration theory associating integration with 
settlement, but goes against the new economics of labour migration (NELM), assuming 
that return migration is the outflow of successful integration. In addition, the effects of 
social ties in sending (negative) and receiving (positive) countries go more or less in the 
expected direction. However, the near-absence of a significant effect of age and length 
of stay on return intentions casts doubt on the assumption that integration, the 
weakening of ties to origin countries and declining return intentions occur “naturally” 
or are simply an “automatic” function of time. 
This is exemplified by the ambiguous and sometimes counterintuitive effects of 
structural integration indicators on return intentions. Owning a household business in 
receiving countries did not affect the likelihood of intending to return. Moreover, 
neither working status nor occupational status had any significant effect on return 
intentions. Yet the most striking result is the positive effect of education on return 
migration intentions. This seems counterintuitive because, reasoning from neoclassical 
and assimilationist perspectives, more highly educated migrants are expected to have 
better opportunities to find attractive jobs, and face fewer integration problems overall. 
However, from NELM and human capital perspectives, the positive relationship 
between education and return intentions does make much more sense. People living in 
developing countries often lack the financial resources to bear the costs and risks of 
setting up and running businesses. This is often related to the malfunctioning of credit 
(capital) and risk (insurance) markets. Assuming that migration is a household strategy 
to overcome such market constraints, as NELM does, it becomes rational for 
households to send out the best-equipped household members to gain a higher income 
which can be remitted and used to invest. In addition, migrants are likely to accumulate 
valuable work and business experience (for instance in commercial agriculture or 
construction), acquire language skills, and build social networks while abroad. Once 
they have accumulated sufficient financial resources and/or human capital to start up a 
business, however, their human capital can be more productive in the origin countries. 
The positive effect of education on return migration intentions counters the 
hypothesis that settlement is the outflow of economic success, and return migration an 
indication of integration failure. This is also corroborated by the positive effect of 
investments in origin countries on return intentions. Yet it is important to avoid a 
deterministic application of theory given the non-significant effects of other structural Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 24 
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integration indicators and the strong negative effect of sociocultural integration on 
return intentions. Hence, there is no unequivocal support for either the NELM or the 
neoclassical hypotheses. 
At first glance, the most obvious explanation for the mixed evidence is that 
motivations for migration are also fundamentally mixed and that different mechanisms 
apply to different groups of migrants. Constant and Massey (2002), who also found 
support for both neoclassical and NELM theories in the case of former “guest workers” 
in Germany, tried to disentangle these mixed findings by splitting up their sample into 
remitting and non-remitting migrants. As hypothesized, remitting migrants behaved 
more consistently with the target earning strategy of NELM whose economic 
motivations are linked to the overcoming of market failures, while the non-remitting 
migrants conformed more closely to neoclassical income-maximizing strategies while 
seeking to make a new life for themselves in Germany. 
As noted before, deciding to remit often comprises a mix of underlying motives 
which are differently related to return migrations. This study also illustrated the limited 
power of initial reasons and causes of migration to predict eventual migration and 
settlement trajectories. Inclusion of initial migration motives and different types of 
remitting behaviour in our study did not substantially improve the prediction of return 
intention. It is possible that migration motives and intentions typically change over 
time. For instance, under uncertain economic and political conditions in origin countries 
and restrictive immigration policies in receiving countries, migrants who intend to 
return may also opt to settle at the destination while maintaining intensive transnational 
ties. 
This also brings us to a more fundamental critique of the long-standing migration 
theories. There is a problematic deterministic circularity in the way in which both 
neoclassical and NELM link initial migration motives to eventual outcomes of 
migration. The direct link that NELM draws between the main motives for migration 
(risk diversification and access to investment capital to overcome market constraints) 
and the act of remitting and returning is just as problematic as the way in which 
neoclassical theories view migration as a utility-maximizing strategy by individuals, 
which, if successful, will tend to lead to their permanent settlement. Examination of the 
extent to which initial motives and strategy are changing over the lifetime span as well 
as the main determinants of these changes, is therefore an important challenge for future 
research. de Haas & Fokkema: Return intention: the impact of integration and transnationalism 
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